Berk Esen on whether Turkey has shifted from authoritarianism to autocracy

Berk Esen on whether Turkey is shifting from competitive authoritarianism to autocracy, dynamics driving the government crackdown, the international context, and critical choices facing the opposition

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You have long warned that the government has been planning this move. Were you expecting such a bold step as İmamoğlu's detention?

I was definitely expecting the Erdoğan regime to turn against İmamoğlu, weaken his base, and at some point use the judiciary to eliminate him. So overall, the judicial move made against the mayor of Turkey's largest city was not a surprise to me. Having said that, I was rather surprised by the scale of the judicial operation. I was under the impression that the government or the courts would go after İmamoğlu's allies first, or that his support circle would be thinned out, and that eventually, only after we get to a stage where there would not be substantial support for İmamoğlu, the courts would go after him. So I thought this whole process would maybe take several months, if not a full year. So the fact that the courts went after İmamoğlu, two of his closest political allies in Istanbul who are themselves district mayors, as well as İmamoğlu's almost entire strategy team, was a bit of a surprise to me. İmamoğlu, having started his primary campaign within the CHP in his speeches, made references to the possibility of him being apprehended by the courts. But I really didn't think it would result in a judicial operation involving nearly 100 people.

You have said elsewhere that the situation will “probably get worse before it gets better”. What do you mean?

Since 2015, my colleague Şebnem Gümüşçü and I have been arguing that Turkish democracy has broken down and Turkey has transitioned to what political scientists refer to as a competitive authoritarian regime. That is a regime where you have regular elections, but those elections are neither free nor fair; however, opposition parties remain viable, contest for power, and actually still have a chance to win some elections against pro-government candidates. So since 2015 we have seen the opposition score some electoral victories. For instance, in June 2015 Erdogan's AKP lost its parliamentary majority. Likewise, in June 2018 had it not been for the MHP's support the AKP would have lacked a parliamentary majority. And of course, in the 2019 and 2024 local elections the main opposition party scored some victories.

I think that what is now happening in Turkey is Erdoğan's government taking deliberate steps to undermine the competitive element of this authoritarian regime, so that after this point we're going to transition to a more hegemonic authoritarian regime, the kind that you see in Venezuela, Russia, Belarus and Azerbaijan. These are cases that hold elections regularly but there is no meaningful competition in these elections and the ruling party goes on to win comfortable majorities using various instruments. That's where we are headed.

By taking this step, arresting the mayor of Turkey's largest city, Erdoğan has crossed the Rubicon. There is no point of return. After this point, there is no way that he can organise an election within the context of a competitive authoritarian regime. He has to turn more authoritarian. He will not be able to just maintain the current level of repression because he will need to crush İmamoğlu, he will need to crush the supporters of İmamoğlu. He will need to use police violence and judicial tools to undermine what is left of Turkey's electoral competition. That's why in the short run I think things are going to get far worse before they can begin to get better.

The reason why I still think that things can get better is because Turkey is not Russia, Turkey is not Venezuela, Turkey is not Azerbaijan or Belarus. In other words, unlike Azerbaijan, Russia and Venezuela, Turkey does not have a rentier state. Turkey lacks rich natural resources whose windfall revenue can offer the government substantial funds to distribute in order to co-opt different segments of society. Venezuela did have a competitive electoral history. But unlike Russia, Belarus and Azerbaijan, Turkey has a very long history of electoral competition and multi-party rule, going back at the very least to 1950. And of course Turkey's opposition is rather strong. The main opposition party controls 35 provinces across the country, most of which are the more populous, more economically developed provinces. The main opposition party actually surpassed the ruling party in last year's local elections. We're looking at a very mobilised, energised and strong main opposition party. Together with other minor opposition parties, they probably make up more than half of the electorate. So in order to really undermine electoral competition, the government will need to hit really hard at these political parties. It will need to repress a significant portion of the electorate at a time when the Turkish economy is very fragile and does not have the luxury of selling some commodities in the international markets to finance these operations.

So the regime may turn more authoritarian. But at some point I think there will come a time when we're going to reach the limits of this authoritarian pressure and the opposition would still be standing. And then the opposition will resist and push back and we may see the regime break or decline – which are, of course, two different scenarios. That's why I'm optimistic. The other reason I'm optimistic is that we have witnessed an outpouring of popular support for Imamoglu and opposition against the government since the day this operation started. Hundreds of thousands of people have taken to the streets; university students are engaging in academic boycotts and every night they are protesting in a different part of Istanbul, as well as other cities. All these structural factors that can slow down a transition to a fully fledged autocracy, along with popular mobilisation, give me hope in the medium and long run. But in the short run I expect more autocratic steps from the government.